iscellaneous  Series  No,  1 


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China  and  World  Peace 

By  H.  G.  Wells. 


Published  by  the  Chinese  Students’  Alliance  in  the 
United  States  of  America. 


Reproduced  Courtesy  Chicago  Tribune. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/chinaworldpeaceOOwell 


PREFACE 


The  article  on  “China”  by  H.  G.  Wells,  the  copy- 
right of  which  is  owned  by  the  Chicago  Tribune  and 
the  New  York  World,  is  herewith  reproduced  through 
the  courtesy  of  the  Chicago  Tribune. 

That  H.  G.  Wells  is  a great  writer  at  the  present 
time  is  an  undisputed  fact.  His  words  mean  definite 
things.  His  views  on  China  as  exposed  in  this  article 
deserve  wide  circulation,  especially  at  this  moment 
when  China  needs  to  be  better  understood. 

As  an  appendage,  we  print  herewith  also  the  China’s 
program  as  was  laid  before  the  committee  on  Far  East- 
ern and  Pacific  problems  in  the  Washington  Conference 
by  the  Chinese  minister,  H.  E.  Sao  Ke  Alfred  Sze. 

C.  P.  C. 


China  and  World  Peace 

By  H.  G.  Wells 

(Copyright:  1921:  By  The  Chicago  Tribune  and  the 
Press  Publishing  Company.”  The  New 
York  World.”) 

The  Chinese  propaganda  in  America  and  western 
Europe  seems  on  the  whole  to  be  conducted  more  effi- 
ciently than  the  Japanese.  And  the  Chinese  student, 
it  seems  to  me,  gets  into  closer  touch  with  the  educated 
American  and  European  because  his  is  a democratic 
and  not  an  aristocratic  habit  of  mind.  He  has  an  in- 
tensely western  sense  of  public  opinion. 

The  masses  of  China  may  be  destitute,  ignorant, 
and  disordered,  but  in  their  mental  habits  they  are 
modern  and  not  medieval,  in  the  sense  that  the  Japan- 
ese seem  to  “get  on”  with  their  western  social  equival- 
ents better  than  any  of  the  Asiatic  people.  And  in- 
creasing multitudes  of  Chinese  are  learning  English 
today ; it  is  the  second  language  in  China. 

Now  if  Japan  is  the  figure  in  the  limelight  at  Wash- 
ington today,  China  is  the  giant  in  the  background,  or, 
if  you  will,  China  is  the  background  and  scene  of  the 
present  Pacific  drama. 

We  have  had  so  much  in  the  papers  lately  about 
these  two  countries,  we  have  been  treated  to  such  a 
feast  of  particulars  about  them  that  most  of  us  have 
long  since  forgotten  thoroughly  the  broad  facts  of  the 
case  and  it  will  be  refreshing  to  recall  them  here 
and  now. 

Let  us  remind  ourselves  that  China  is  a country  with 
a population  amounting  at  the  lowest  estimate  to  be- 
tween two  and  three  times  the  population  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  France  and  England  put  together.  This 
population  has  the  longest  unbroken  tradition  of  peace- 


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ful  industry  in  the  world.  It  is  essentially  civilized;  it 
respects  learning  and  civility  profoundly.  A common 
literature  and  ancient  traditions  keep  its  people  one. 
In  the  past,  China  has  been  divided  again  and  again — 
always  to  reunite.  But  it  has  become  “old  fashioned,” 
dangerously  old  fashioned,  perhaps  by  reason  of  its 
very  stability ; it  has  lagged  behind  most  of  the  world 
in  the  development  of  its  transport  and  economic 
possibilities. 

In  mineral  deposits  and  other  natural  resources  and 
in  the  industrial  capability  it  has  more  undeveloped 
wealth  than  any  other  single  people  in  the  world.  It 
is  only  in  the  last  century  or  so  that  China  has  lagged 
behind.  Only  a few  centuries  ago  China  was  as 
civilized  as  Europe  and  politically  more  stable.  In  a 
century  or  so  she  may  be  again  the  most  civilized  and 
intelligent  power  in  the  world,  flourishing  in  fellowship 
and  perfect  understanding  with  the  great  states  of 
America  and  Europe. 

She  may  be — if  she  is  not  torn  to  pieces  and  kept 
in  a state  of  enfeeblement  and  disorder  by  the  hostile 
action  of  external  powers. 

But  at  present  China  is  in  a state  of  political  im- 
patence.  Her  Manchu  imperialism  has  proved  itself 
to  be  hopelessly  inefficient  and  China  is  now  struggling 
to  reconstruct  upon  modern  republican  lines,  obviously 
suggested  by  the  American  example. 

A few  decades  ago  Japan  astonished  the  world  by 
Europeanizing  herself  upon  Prussian  lines.  China 
now,  under  far  less  favorable  conditions  and  with  a 
vaster  country  and  a less  disciplined  people,  is  strug- 
gling to  Americanize  herself.  But  it  is  no  easy  task  to 
make  over  a people  at  one  stride  from  a medieval 
autocracy  to  a modern  democracy.  It  is  far  easier  to 
Prussianize  than  to  Americanize,  for  in  the  one  case 


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you  have  only  to  train  an  official  class  and  in  the  other 
you  must  educate  a whole  people. 

China  is  torn  by  dissensions;  the  south  jars  with 
the  north;  she  has  two  or  more  governments,  each 
claiming  to  be  THE  Chinese  government,  and  whole 
provinces  have  fallen  under  the  sway  of  military  ad- 
venturers. It  is  a distressing  spectacle,  but  it  was 
probably  an  inevitable  phase  in  the  development  of 
New  China.  Before  we  fall  a prey  to  anti-Chinese 
propaganda  it  is  well  to  recall  how  long  it  has  always 
taken  to  build  up  the  necessary  understandings  and 
habits  of  association  upon  which  a new  political  sys- 
tem rests. 

France,  for  example,  was  a land  of  revolutions  and 
political  instability  for  nearly  a century  after  the  great 
revolution.  America  wrangled  feebly  anddangerously 
for  several  years  after  thewar  of  independence  before 
she  establishing  her  federal  government ; she  only 
cemented  her  union  after  a colossal  struggle;  she  was 
not  really  and  securely  one  unit  until  a century  had 
elapsed. 

During  these  long  decades  of  probation  foreign  ob- 
servers preached  endlessly  about  the  fickleness  of  the 
French  and  the  political  iefficiency  of  the  Americans 
and  foretold  the  certainty  of  a break  up  of  the  United 
States,  just  as  today  they  sneer  at  young  China  and 
foretell  the  political  disintegration  of  the  Chinese. 

And  we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  forces  of  or- 
ganization and  renewal  in  China  struggle  against  pe- 
culiar difficulties  and  interferences  quite  outside  the 
happier  experiences  of  France  and  America.  In  par- 
ticular, they  struggle  against  an  intolerable  and  par- 
alyzing amount  of  foreign  interference. 

The  brilliant  series  of  adventures  and  accidents  by 
which  a London  trading  company  added  the  empire  of 
Great  Mogul  as  a picturesque,  but  incongruously  big 


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jewel  to  the  British  crown  set  an  extraordinarily  bad 
precedent  in  Asiatic  affairs.  It  obsessed  European 
political  thought  with  the  impossible  dream  of  carving 
up  all  Asia  into  similar  domains.  The  mogul’s  empire 
was  itself  an  empire  of  conquest  in  a land  saturated 
by  ideas  of  caste  and  this  gave  all  the  European  adven- 
turers the  attitude  of  high  caste  men  benevolently  con- 
suming inferior  races. 

In  that  spirit,  Europe — with  Japan  coming  in  pres- 
ently as  a hopeful  student  of  European  methods — had 
been  trying  to  cook,  carve  up  and  fight  for  the  portions 
of  China  for  nearly  a century,  treating  these  wonderful 
people  as  an  inferior  race.  The  very  worst  that  can 
be  said  about  Japan  with  regard  to  China  is  that  she 
has  been  too  vigorously  European. 

Consider  how  it  would  have  been  with  the  United 
States  in  the  years  of  discord  that  led  up  to  the  civil 
war  if  these  difficulties  had  been  complicated  by  three 
such  embarrassments  as  there : First,  that  most  for- 
eigners, except  now  the  Germans  and  Austrians,  are 
outside  the  reach  of  the  native  courts;  and  their  dis- 
putes with  Chinese  go  before  special  foreign  courts ; 
that  they  are  specially  favored  in  regard  to  property 
and  shipping ; secondly,  that  the  Chinese  government  is 
restricted  from  raising  revenue  by  any  tariff  above  a 
flat  rate  of  5 per  cent,  and  that  they  are  also  strictly 
restricted  to  2^  per  cent  in  their  interior  dues  upon 
foreign  (but  not  Chinese)  trade,  so  that  they  are  in 
fact  unable  to  raise  enough  revenue  to  maintain  an 
efficient  government;  and,  thirdly,  that  nearly  all  the 
Chinese  railways — and  as  every  American  knows, 
transport  is  the  very  life  of  a modern  state — are  in  the 
grip  of  this  foreign  country  or  that. 

These  are  the  open  and  manifest  inconveniences  of 
the  situation,  but  behind  these  more  open  aspects  there 
is  a vast  tangle  of  intervention  between  Chinese  and 


6 


Chinese  affairs,  schemes  for  further  exploitation, 
financial  entanglements,  vast  concession  plans  and  proj- 
ects for  “spheres  of  influence”  for  this  aggressive  for- 
eign nation  or  that.  And  this  foreign  influence  is  not 
the  influence  of  one  foreign  power  pursuing  a single 
and  consistent  policy,  but  a number  of  competing 
powers,  all  pursuing  different  ends  and  pulling  things 
this  way  and  that.  How  could  any  country  recon- 
struct itself  while  it  was  entangled  in  such  a net  of 
interference?  No  people  on  earth  could  do  such  a 
thing. 

The  plain  fact  is  that,  if  China  is  to  reconstruct  her- 
self ,that  net  has  to  be  cut  away.  It  is  not  enough  to 
warn  Japan  out  of  China,  or  to  say  “open  door”  for 
China.  The  open  door  is  good  for  the  ventilation  of 
that  great  apartment,  but  what  is  also  needed  is  a clear- 
ing out  of  the  incumbrances  inside.  These  incumbran- 
ces are  not  primarily  Japanese. 

The  five  great  powers  sit  at  a green  table  in  the 
form  of  a horseshoe  in  the  conference,  and  the  four 
lesser  powers  at  a straight  table  like  the  armature  of  a 
horseshoe  magnet.  At  the  left  hand  corner,  next  the 
Japanese,  are  the  three  Chinese  representatives.  I 
gather  that  will  be  allowed  to  say  “Shantung”  at  the 
conference  in  moderation,  but  not  Tibet,  nor  Tonquin, 
nor  the  east  China — or  indeed  any — railway. 

I doubt  if  either  Mr.  Balfour  or  M.  Briand  will 
nerve  himself  to  say  these  forbidden  words.  But  an 
irresponsible  journalist  may  write  them. 

If  there  is  to  be  a real  end  to  war  and  disarmament, 
there  has  to  be  a release  of  China  to  free  Chinese  con- 
trol, and  that  means  a self-denying  ordinance  from 
ALL  the  great  powers.  It  will  be  an  easy  one  for 
America  and  Italy  to  accept,  but  it  will  be  a difficult 
sacrifice,  indeed,  for  the  two  hoary  leaders  in  the 
breakup  of  China,  Great  Britain  and  France.  Neither 


7 


country  has  a bad  heart,  but  long  ago  in  the  east  they 
acquired  some  very  bad  habits  lead  very  quickly  to 
disaster. 

The  real  test  of  the  quality  of  the  conference  will 
appear  when  some  issue  arises  which  involves  an  as- 
sertion or  denial  of  the  principle  of  “unhand  and  keep 
your  hands  off  China.”  If  the  Chinese  are  worth  while 
the  conference  has  to  establish  that  principle.  It  can- 
not be  gracefully  advanced  by  America  because  Amer- 
ica has  so  little  to  relinquish.  It  CAN  be  established 
at  the  initiative  of  either  Britain  or  France.  It  seems 
plain  to  me  that  official  America  is  waiting  for  some 
move  in  that  direction  from  either  or  both  of  these 
powers.  If  that  principle  of  a free  China  is  established 
at  the  Washington  conference  the  way  will  have  been 
opened  in  the  not  very  remote  future  to  a healthy  and 
vigorous  United  States  of  China,  a great  modern,  paci- 
fic, and  progressive  power. 

And  when  I write  “China.”  I mean  what  any  sen- 
sible man  means  when  he  writes  “China.”  I mean  all 
those  parts  of  Asia  in  which  the  Chinese  people  and 
the  Chinese  culture  prevail.  I include  at  least  south 
Manchuria,  which  is  as  surely  Chinese  as  Texas  is 
American,  and  which  can  no  more  be  given  to  any  other 
power  without  the  consent  of  China  than  my  overcoat 
can  be  given  by  one  passerby  to  another. 

The  plan  alternative  to  a released  and  renascent 
China  is  the  cutting  up  of  China  among  the  aggressive 
powers  to  the  tune  of  the  popular  American  air  “The 
Open  Door,”  the  demoralization  and  disintegration  of 
the  Chinese,  international  elbowing,  competition,  quar- 
rels among  the  powers  who  have  “shared”  China  and 
at  last,  the  next  great  war — which  it  will  be  just  as 
aesy  for  America  to  keep  out  of  as  the  great  war 
of  1914-18. 


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CHINA’S  PROGRAM  BEFORE  WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE 


China’s  statement  of  principles,  as  outlined  on 
Nov.  16,  1921,  before  the  committee  on  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  problems,  by  the  Chinese  minister,  Dr. 
Sze,  follows : 

“In  view  of  the  fact  that  China  must  necessarily  play 
an  important  part  in  the  deliberations  of  this  conference 
with  reference  to  the  political  situation  in  the  Far  East, 
the  Chinese  delegation  has  thought  it  proper  that  they 
should  take  the  first  possible  opportunity  to  state  cer- 
tain general  principles  which  in  their  opinion  should 
guide  the  conference  in  the  determinations  which  it 
is  to  make. 

“Certain  of  the  specific  applications  of  the  principles 
which  it  is  expected  that  the  conference  will  make,  it  is 
our  intention  later  to  bring  forward,  but  at  the  present 
time  it  is  deemed  sufficient  simply  to  propose  the  prin- 
ciples which  I shall  presently  read. 

“In  formulating  these  principles,  the  purpose  has 
been  kept  steadily  in  view  of  obtaining  rules  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  existing  and  possible  future  po- 
litical and  economic  problems  in  the  Far  East  and  the 
Pacific  may  be  most  justly  settled,  and  with  due  regard 
to  the  rights  and  legitimate  interests  of  all  the  powers 
concerned. 

“Thus  it  has  been  sought  to  harmonize  the  particular 
interests  of  China  with  these  general  interests  of  all 
the  world.  China  is  anxious  to  play  her  part,  not  only 
in  maintaining  peace,  but  in  promoting  the  material 
advancement  and  the  cultural  development  of  all  the 
nations.  She  wishes  to  make  her  vast  natural  resources 
available  to  all  peoples  who  need  them,  and  in  return 
to  receive  the  benefits  of  free  and  equal  intercourse 
with  them. 


9 


“In  order  that  she  may  do  this  it  is  necessary  that 
she  should  have  every  possible  opportunity  to  develop 
her  political  institutions  in  accordance  with  the  genius 
and  needs  of  her  own  people.  China  is  now  contending 
with  certain  difficult  problems  which  necessarily  arise, 
when  any  country  makes  a radical  change  in  her  form 
of  government. 

“These  problems  she  will  be  able  to  solve  if  given 
the  opportunity  to  do  so.  This  means  not  only  that 
she  should  be  freed  from  the  danger  or  threat  of  for- 
eign aggression,  but  that,  so  far  as  circumstances  will 
possibly  permit,  she  be  relieved  from  limitations  which 
now  deprive  her  of  autonomous  administrative  action 
and  prevent  her  from  securing  adequate  public 
revenues. 

“In  conformity  with  the  agenda  of  the  conference, 
the  Chinese  government  proposes  for  the  consideration 
of  and  adoption  by  the  conference  the  following  gen- 
eral principles  to  be  applied  in  the  determining  of  the 
questions  relating  to  China : 

“i.  (a)  The  powers  engage  to  respect  and  observe 
the  territorial  integrity  and  political  and  administra- 
tive independence  of  the  Chinese  republic. 

“(b)  China,  upon  her  part,  is  prepared  to  give  an 
undertaking  not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  portion  of  her 
territory  or  littoral  to  any  power. 

“2.  China,  being  in  full  accord  with  the  principle  of 
the  so-called  open  door,  or  equal  opportunity  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  having  treaty 
relations  with  China,  is  prepared  to  accept  and  apply 
it  in  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  republic  without  exception. 

“2.  With  a view  to  strengthening  mutual  confidence 
and  maintaining  peace  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East, 
the  powers  agree  not  to  conclude  between  themselves 
any  treaty  or  agreement  directly  affecting  China  or  the 
general  peace  in  these  regions  without  previously 


10 


notifying  China  and  giving  to  her  an  opportunity  to 
participate. 

“4.  All  special  rights,  privileges,  immunities,  or  com- 
mitments, whatever  their  character  or  contractural 
basis,  claimed  by  any  of  the  powers  in  or  relating  to 
China,  are  to  be  declared,  and  all  such  or  future  claims 
not  so  made  known  are  to  be  deemed  null  and  void. 
The  rights,  privilleges,  immunities  and  commitments, 
now  known  or  to  be  declared,  are  to  be  examined  with 
a view  to  determining  their  scope  and  validity,  and,  if 
valid,  to  harmonize  them  with  one  another  and  with 
the  principles  declared  by  this  conference. 

“5.  Immediately  or  as  soon  as  circumstances  will 
permit,  existing  limitations  upon  China’s  political  juris- 
dictianal  and  administrative  freedom  of  action  are  to 
be  removed. 

“6.  Reasonable,  definite  terms  of  duration  are  to  be 
attached  to  China’s  present  commitments  which  are 
without  time  limits. 

“7.  In  the  interpretation  of  instruments  granting 
special  rights  or  privileges,  the  well  established  prin- 
ciple of  construction  that  such  grants  shall  be  strictly 
construed  in  favor  of  the  grantors  is  to  be  observed. 

“8.  China’s  rights  as  a neutral  are  to  be  fully  re- 
spected in  future  wars  to  which  she  is  not  a party. 

“9.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  international  disputes  in  the  Pacific  and  the 
bar  East. 

‘To.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  future  conferences 
to  be  held  from  time  to  time  for  the  discussion  of  inter- 
national questions  relative  to  the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East,  as  a basis  for  the  determination  of  common  poli- 
cies of  the  signatory  powers  in  relation  thereto.” 


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Additional  copies  may  be  obtained  upon  request 
from  Y.  L.  Mei,  5800  Marland  Avenue,  Chicago, 
Illinois,  or  Y.  L.  Mason,  Munsey  Building,  1329 
E.  Street  N.  W.,  Washington,  D.  C. 


